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PREFACE
In spite of the fact that the papers collected in this booklet were
written as informal radio talks, not as essays intended for publication,
and in spite of the fact that their authors have therefore consented to
their publication only with some modest reluctance, the College is none-
theless glad to print them, in response to numerous requests.
Most radio speeches, concerned with the tragic problems confront-
ing the world today, tend to limit themselves to the narow context of
current events. While an abundance of speeches of that type is neces-
sary and profoundly valuable, another kind is needed as well, the kind,
namely, which members of college and university faculties are par-
ticularly suited to give and of which the papers in this collection are an
example, the kind that endeavors to interpret contemporary problems
and events in the light of history, of philosophy, and of science. Recog-
nizing this need, the Committee on Radio Programs by the Faculty has
organized the current series entitled "The World in Crisis," which is
broadcast Friday evenings over Station WRNL, Richmond, Virginia,
and which will be continued through the academic year 1940-41. The
first eight talks of this series, which comprise the present booklet, have
met with so favorable a reception that the College regards their publica-
tion as a further service that it cannot refuse to render.
The following is the schedule for the rest of the series
:
December 13: "The War and India", Carlton Wood, Assistant
Professor of Government.
January 10 : "Our Relations with Latin America", Cecil Morales,
Assistant Professor of Modern Languages.
February 7 : "America and the Far East", Lionel Laing, Assistant
Professor of Government.
February 14: "British and German Methods of Finance—I", S.
Donald Southworth, Professor of Economics.
February 21 : "British and German Methods of Finance—II", S.
Donald Southworth.
February 28: "The Family in Wartime", Daniel J. Blocker,
Professor of Sociology.
March 7 : "The Schools in a Dictatorship", George H. Armacost,
Associate Professor of Education.
March 14 : "Crime in Wartime", Edgar M. Foltin, Professor of
Jurisprudence.
March 21 : "War Propaganda in the United States", Thomas
Pinckney, Director of Public Relations.
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March 28 : "Art as Propaganda", Thomas Thorne, Instructor in
Fine Arts.
April 11: "Music in Exile", Allan Sly, Associate Professor of
Fine Arts.
April 18: "Aerial Warfare", William W. Merrymon, Associate
Professor of Physics.
April 25 : "Chemical Warfare", Robert G. Robb, Professor of
Organic Chemistry.
May 2: "Synthetic Products in War", Alfred R. Armstrong, As-
sistant Professor of Chemistry.
May 9 : "Biological Warfare—I", Roy P. Ash, Assistant Profes-
sor of Biology.





George J. Ryan, Associate Professor of Ancient Languages
Fundamental Causes of the Second World War
Harold Lees Fowler, Associate Professor of History
Immediate Causes of the Present World War
Bruce T. McCully, Instructor in History
The Lesson of France
Charles J. Duke, Assistant to the President
The Civil Liberties in a Time of Crisis
Donald Meiklejohn, Associate Professor of Philosophy
Industrial Mobilization
James E. Pate, Professor of Political Science
Industrial Control in Time of War
Charles F. Marsh, Professor of Economics
The Future of the British Empire
Warner Moss, Professor of Government
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FASCISM IN ANTIQUITY
ne of the reasons why no generation can write its own his-
tory adequately is that it lacks perspective. We live too close
to the events, the persons and the theories of our own day to
view them entirely dispassionately or to evaluate them critically.
Political systems, particularly, should be viewed in their entirety, their
beginnings, their accomplishments and their end, before we can judge
them safely and wisely as a whole. But if contemporary systems such
as the totalitarian state seem only to have just begun, how can we judge
them at all ?
History rescues us from this impasse. With steady insistence, from
the beginning of recorded time, she keeps repeating for us that the
story of the future is written largely in the story of the past, for those
who have eyes to read it there. It is a platitude, of course, that history
repeats itself, but wise men do not scorn platitudes. It would be ex-
tremely valuable, therefore, for us today, if we could examine in the
records of the past a perfect totalitarian state ; see its beginning and its
end; trace its pattern infallibly, rate its value and foretell its fate.
Strangely enough there once was a such a state. And so perfect
a pattern is it of our modern authoritarian systems that we could say
our modern forms have been modelled upon it, if we did not know
the limited educational backgrounds of modern totalitarian leaders. Per-
haps the most striking and interesting thing about this ancient Fascist
State is that it was evolved by the same race which has given us our
ideas of Democracy. It was this latter for which the Greeks are best
known and for which the world is most indebted to them. Diametrically
opposed to the earlier and later exaltation of a God-King or a divine-
like leader inspiring blind devotion, and the servile submission of the
great mass of the people which is a corollary of that quasi-religious
exaltation, the whole progress of Greek life and thought, particularly as
we see it in Athens, shows the steady creation of a new conception of
the value of the individual, the innate dignity and worth of man as man.
But Sparta was an exception. Dorian Sparta, southern neighbor
of Ionian Athens, situated in one of the few fertile regions of Greece,
evolved a political and social philosophy, utterly different from anything
else in all of Greece. Even contemporary Greeks knew this con-
trast and wondered at it. And their judgment of it changed with the
times. At first they scorned it; he was a barbarian, to a Greek, "who
believed without thinking and lived without liberty." But later, when
Democracy had bungled inefficiently, full of corruption and demagoguery,
there were many even in Athens, cradle of democracy, who turned ad-
miring and envious eyes toward the efficiency and thoroughness of
Sparta.
There is a powerfully illuminating lesson for us in the story of
Sparta. No one could have foreseen in the eighth and seventh cen-
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turies B. C. what its future would be. It is true, they were Dorians,
relatively late-comers into Greece, introduced to civilization later than
the Ionians and destined always to be somewhat their inferiors ; but they
were Greeks. And they gave to the world in their early days the
magnificent creation of the Choral Lyric, greatest of all the lyric gifts
of Greece, the heart and soul of later Athenian Drama ; they gave to
the world the Olympic games with their ideals of graceful physical
development and sportsmanship; and the innate strength and simplicity
of their character and genius is forever witnessed in the Doric Column.
But these were creations of the eighth and seventh centuries ; how did
Sparta change?
The Spartiates—Spartans of pure Dorian blood—were relatively
few, perhaps 10,000 in a population forty times their number. To
preserve their racial integrity free from mixture (which never seemed to
bother the other Greek peoples) and to preserve surely and safely their
rule over their subjects at home, a rigid form of control was neces-
sary; and, later, with security established at home, to further their
development abroad and to gain those advantages by conquest, which
other Greek peoples obtained by peaceful colonization, a highly developed
military machine was necessary. With magnificent adaptation of every
possible means to attain this end, the whole of Spartan life was regi-
mented from the cradle to the grave.
It is not important to recount the mythical establishment of the
Constitution of their state by Lycurgus—who received it, of course,
direct from the god at Delphi. This is of a piece with the almost reli-
gious devotion of the Spartans. Nor are the actual provisions of the
Constitution important in themselves (they never are in a totalitarian
state) such as: the two kings who, by the fifth century, had become
mere figure-heads; the assembly of older men (gerousia) whose duties
and authority in practise were limited to voting "yes"; the chief office
of ephor (or overseer) ; and the three social groups : Spartiates, Perioeci
and Helots. The significant thing for us is to examine how the
Spartans really lived. Strangely enough, nearly all our information
of the Spartan system comes from an Athenian, a certain Xenephon, a
disgruntled aristocrat of the fourth century, who, despising the un-
certainties and errors of democracy as he saw it, wrote an enthusiastic
book on "The Lacedemonian State." Plutarch's eulogistic life of
Lycurgus fills in the details of the picture, a picture which seems to us
terrifyingly modern.
Because the central support of Spartan life was the army, Sparta
formed its moral code, characteristically enough, on the military ideal.
The only virtues Sparta knew were virtues of the camp ; a Spartan's
highest honor and happiness was death upon the field of battle. "Re-
turn with your shield or on it" was more than "a Spartan Mother's
farewell to her soldier son", it was the cardinal tenet in a Spartan's
credo. His life was not his own but Sparta's, for he had no worth of
himself save only as a servant of the State.
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Such an ideal, denying so many human values in life, could be
attained only by men who were trained to it from birth by the most
rigorous discipline. At birth, therefore, the State claimed the infant
Spartan. His very parents had been predetermined by a ruthless sys-
tem of eugenics; purity of blood, health and loyalty to the State were
the only considerations permitted in a Spartan marriage. Nor was
wed-lock strictly necessary. It was the solemn duty of every Spartan
woman to bear many sons for her country ; there was no such thing as
illegitimacy, so long as the blood-strain of Spartiates was kept unsullied.
The Spartan boy was taken from his mother at the age of seven
and began a barracks-life existence that ended only with his death
or expulsion from the State. His training was simple: to suffer
silently, to obey blindly and to steal successfully. The sole aim of
all his schooling was development of martial worth and courage. Cruel
tricks and trials were invented to test his vigor and fortitude. He was
taught to believe that pity, kindness, charity and the gentler virtues were
weaknesses. There was little reading and writing because only a few
books contained all a Spartan needed to know. Those books which were
judged dangerous to the system were excluded from the State or pub-
licly burned. If the boy proved worthy he was allowed to attend the
public meetings, was expected to listen carefully so that he might im-
bibe the spirit and ideals of his leader. If, finally, he survived with
honor the trials and hardships of his youthful training, he was admitted
to the party with all the rights and privileges of a citizen.
The Spartan girl remained at home, but none the less her life was
rigidly regulated by the State. From childhood on, she was required
to take part in vigorous and happy games—running, wrestling and
throwing the javelin (strength through joy). The aim of her education
was solely to make her strong and healthy for easy and frequent mother-
hood. She served her country best who bore most soldiers for her
country's army. Mental training was not to be wasted upon the
Spartan girl.
Of course there was no home-life. The aims of the State were
not to be hampered by the ties of family or the bonds of friendship.
The barracks where the Spartan citizen spent his life (after the age of
twenty), where food was carefully rationed so as to be slightly inade-
quate in amount, was admirably designed, as Plutarch says, to harden
him to the privations of war, and to keep him from the softening in-
fluence of home.
The vaunted Spartan equality of wealth was a mere fiction; great
inequalities existed although they were carefully hidden. In spite of
rigid prohibitions against foreign trade, and in spite of the ingenious
invention of a cumbersome iron currency, great fortunes were amassed.
Official corruption in Sparta (as Herodotus shows) surpassed anything
to be found in all of ancient Greece. Ephors, generals and kings were
alike corruptible—each in proportion to his importance and his price.
Strict supervision of visitors to the State, severe laws against
foreign travel and a careful censorship served to keep even the faintest
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knowledge of the outside world of Hellas, where liberty, art and litera-
ture flourished, from entering and disturbing the servile minds of
Spartans. And over all the system was the secret-police (the Crypteia)
composed of the younger and more ruthless men of the party, who
were trained to spy out the least disaffection, every chance unguarded
word of complaint, and whose duty it was to kill, upon the mere sus-
picion, any helot-critic of the State.
To no people—even to the Spartans—would such a life have been
possible without the almost mystic fervor of men who follow blindly
and ecstatically an inspiration. Putarch, writing in enthusiastic praise
of the system, gives us unconsciously the clue to the understanding of it.
"Nobody" he writes "was free to live as he wished, but as if in a camp,
everyone has his way of life and his public duties fixed; and he held
that he did not belong to himself but to his leader." And again:
"They made the citizens accustomed to have neither the will nor the
ability to lead a private life; but, like bees, always to be organic parts
of the community, to cling around their leader, and in an ecstasy of
enthusiasm and selfless ambition, to belong wholly to their country."
It is strange indeed that such a system could ever have appealed
to intelligent men. Yet late in the fifth century and early in the fourth,
there were many Athenian thinkers who, more than a little fearful of
the excesses of a decadent democracy, idealized the law and order,
the efficiently-regimented life of their neighbor Sparta. They were too
close to the system to see it clearly and judge it properly. They did not
know that emphasis upon mere physical perfection had killed off all
capacity for enjoyment of the things of the spirit. They could not learn,
by personal contact, the selfishness, the narrowness of mind, the cold,
hard cruelty of the Spartan character. But, most important of all, they
did not realize that all the bright promises which Ancient Sparta had
held for art and letters, had faded completely; that the Sparta of the
Choral song, the Doric Column and even martial poetry was gone for-
ever.
And then, at the end of the fifth century, the once glorious
democratic Athens, torn by domestic strife and, worst of all, shot
through and through with Spartan sympathizers, fell before this perfect
military machine and the light of civilization in Greece went out.
Sparta's own end was not long after. Supreme in Greece, at last,
Sparta showed the shallow emptiness of the life she offered. She ruled
but briefly, hated and abhorred even by her friends. When she fell,
the rest of Hellas quietly gathered the shattered fragments of the
ancient life for future ages. But Sparta left nothing to the world
except a bitter lesson.
A great people, capable of heights of accomplishment in the realms
of civilization, descended to barbarism, its own victory ashes in its
grasp, through a blind, unthinking, servile service of the State; this
is the lesson of Fascism in antiquity.
George J. Ryan.
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FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES OF THE SECOND
WORLD WAR
he subject, Fundamental Causes of the Second World War, is
obviously too broad for adequate discussion in a brief talk.
Furthermore, we are still too close to the momentous events
of the past twenty years to have the proper perspective for
final judgment. However, it may be of value to attempt to suggest
some of the factors and events which will undoubtedly receive detailed
treatment when a definitive study is made in the future.
The Peace Settlement of 1919 had within itself the germs of future
wars. While, in some respects, the treaties constituted a normal peace,
nevertheless the total effect upon the defeated powers was severe and
humiliating. Also we must remember that they had been led to expect
more lenient terms. The clauses of the treaties fall into three main
groups: the territorial provisions, the disarmament provisions, and the
reparations provisions. Each category had its bad and unreasonable
features.
The union of Germany and Austria was forbidden. The Republic
of Austria, created out of the ruins of the Dual Monarchy, was small
and economically unsound. It was wholly German in character and from
the beginning there was a strong movement within Austria for Ansch-
luss. The League of Nations and the Allies supported the artificial and
precarious independence of this little state but with the growth of Nazi
Germany and the political and economic confusion in Vienna, this un-
natural situation could not be maintained.
The creation of the Polish Corridor to give the new Poland direct
outlet to the Baltic and the establishment of Danzig as a Free City,
were even worse features of the territorial settlement. The Corridor
contained a sizeable German minority and Danzig was entirely a German
city. Furthermore the Corridor separated East Prussia, one of the
oldest possessions of the House of Hohenzollern, from the rest of Ger-
many. An aroused militaristic Germany would not tolerate the con-
tinuance of this situation and there is good reason to believe that, if
Hitler had not already used force against Austria and Czechoslovakia,
a peaceful readjustment of the Polish question might have been reached.
Then the Allies did not keep faith with Germany on disarmament.
Germany was deprived of most of her weapons of war on the under-
standing that the Allies would likewise disarm. All attempts at general
world disarmament after 1920 failed either because of conflict over
technical details and arrangements or because of refusal to grant equality
to Germany. The final break came in 1933 when Hitler suddenly de-
cided to put an end to this useless discussion and win a place of equality
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for Germany. He announced Germany's withdrawal from the Dis-
armament Conference and from the League of Nations and proceeded,
in defiance of the Treaty of Versailles, to re-arm Germany on a
tremendous scale. In March 1935 he proclaimed to the world the extent
of his plans and in the following year he made his western frontier
secure by the re-occupation of the demilitarized Rhineland.
The problem of reparations was equally humiliating and irritating.
Furthermore it involved the whole question of a stable German and
European economy. The aim of the Allies, particularly France, was
to place Germany in permanent financial bondage. The settlement
reached by the Reparations Commission in May 1921 was impossible.
The total bill and the annual payments imposed on Germany were far
too high. She soon had to default and by 1922 her financial structure
was on the verge of collapse. France was determined that Germany
could and must pay and the result was the unfortunate French occupa-
tion of the Ruhr and the collapse of the German mark. Germany was
drowning in a sea of inflation and reparations were one of the causes.
The German Republic never fully recovered from that catastrophe.
The whole question of reparations was re-studied by the Dawes Com-
mission and the resulting Dawes Plan of 1924 considerably reduced the
amount of the annual payments but did not attempt to fix the final
amount which Germany should ultimately pay. The Young Plan,
finaly adopted in 1930, worked out an arrangement whereby Germany
would have completed her payment of reparations in 1988. Then
quickly came the world depression and the Hoover Moratorium of 1931
by which all reparations payments by Germany and all war debt pay-
ments by the Allies to the United States should cease for a year. In
fact, the Moratorium was permanent.
In general, then, some of the major provisions of the Treaty of
Versailles were deeply resented in Germany. Furthermore several of
these provisions were applied and enforced in an unreasonable and un-
fortunate manner. On the other hand it is perfectly true that certain
groups in Germany, notably the Nazis, greatly exaggerated the faults
of the treaty and tried, for political purposes, to blame all of Germany's
woes upon that document.
The failure of the League of Nations and everything for which it
stood can likewise be considered a fundamental cause of the present
conflict. The League represented collective security and the peaceful
negotiation of international disputes. It was destroyed by the propo-
nents of force. The League labored under certain handicaps from the
beginning. In the first place some of the enthusiasm and idealism which
contributed to the demand for the League had already disappeared by
the time it was put into operation. Furthermore the League never en-
joyed the complete membership or the full support of the major powers.
The failure of the United States to join was a severe blow at the very
beginning. Germany was not invited to join until 1926 and both she
and Japan had withdrawn by the time Russia was admitted in 1934.
In addition the League did not receive the undivided support of major
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states like England and France. The governments of those states
wavered in their allegiance to the principle of collective security and at
times seemed to give merely lip-service to the League for popular con-
sumption at home. At other times they seemed to be using the mach-
inery at Geneva to further their own national and selfish ends. Finally
public opinion throughout the world was rather lukewarm toward the
League.
However, even with these handicaps, the League appeared to work
fairly well in the first ten years of its history. But we can see now
that most of this success was won in minor disputes and that as soon as
it was confronted with major problems its basic weaknesses emerged.
The Sino-Japanese dispute of 1931 was the first great blow to the
League. Japan was guilty of unprovoked attack upon China, but the
League, beyond condemning Japan, was unable to do anything about it.
The failure of the member powers to agree upon any decisive action
was an eloquent lesson to the smaller and weaker powers. An aggres-
sor state, in violation of her commitments, began a war of conquest
against a weaker neighbor and escaped unpunished. Could small states
look to the League for protection in the future? The principle of col-
lective security had surrendered to the use of force.
The second and crowning blow to the League and the principles
for which it stood came in the Italo-Ethiopian affair of 1935-36. This
time the League did impose economic sanctions upon the aggressor but
its efforts were ruined by the policy of England and France. These two
powers, alarmed by the rise of Nazi Germany, were seeking the friend-
ship of Italy. They did not wish to do anything which would really
hinder Mussolini in his conquest of Ethiopia. However, being prominent
members of the League and mindful of public opinion at home, they had
to go through the motions of supporting the action of the League.
Furthermore they might need the assistance of the League in the future.
The real policy of England and France was disclosed in the famous
Hoare-Laval plan of December 1935. This destroyed the whole idea
of League action against aggression. Once more force, the weapon of
the totalitarian regimes, had triumphed over the shortsightedness of the
democracies and the weaknesses in the machinery of collective security.
But even now, granting the failure of the Peace Settlement and the
League of Nations to provide Europe with stability and security, the
second world war might have been avoided. The most important posi-
tive factor in producing that conflict was the policy of Nazi Germany.
For several years the real character of National Socialism was mis-
understood. Many people both inside and outside Germany believed
that it was a purely domestic development that would remain bottled up
in Germany and even there that its worst excesses would soon wear
themselves out. Our eyes have now been opened. National Socialism
is a dynamic revolutionary movement which first destroyed every trace
of democracy and freedom in Germany and then turned to destroy
Europe. The key to Nazi foreign policy is the demand for Lebensraum
—living space. This means that Germany must have sufficient terri-
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tory to provide her with absolute freedom of action. She must be
completely free of dependence upon others. She must be absolutely
blockade-proof. This goal could be attained only by German control
over all Europe. Hitler was confident that this could be done because
he believed the democracies were on the decline. By making his de-
mands piecemeal he could force England and France, the chief repre-
sentatives of the old order, to make one concession after the other until
it was almost impossible for them to call a halt. England and France
believed that by concessions, by a policy of appeasement, Hitler could
be satisfied. They did not realize that each concession sharpened his
eagerness for a new attack and made him more confident of ultimate
success. For Hitler the really decisive action is supposed to take place
before the outbreak of war. It consists in a demoralization of the
enemy. Given this true character of the movement, compromise, for
National Socialism is death. Once Hitler had embarked upon this policy
of expansion, he could not stop. He set loose the train of events which
led directly to the present war.
Harold Lees Fowler.
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IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE PRESENT
WORLD WAR
88
he immediate causes of the present war are to be found in
the train of events which began with the Nazi seizure of Austria
in March 1938. These events proceeded, on the one hand,
from the determination of Hitler to carry out a program of
territorial expansion in the heart of the European continent, and on
the other, the tardy realization of France and Britain that they must
yield to Hitler complete control of the continent or resist, making war
inevitable. The Nazi program rested upon two principles: first, that
all people of German blood in whatever territory they happened to live
morally belonged to the German Reich; second, that Germany as a
great and highly populated country was entitled to Lebensraum—that is,
sufficient territory to provide Germany with absolute freedom of action.
To carry out this program Hitler relied upon a simple abrogation of all
diplomatic morality, on clever timing, and a new technique of non-
military penetration, which when necessary was followed by actual mili-
tary invasion.
Austria, the first victim of these tactics, had long been coveted by
the Third Reich. As early as 1934, Austrian Nazis at German instiga-
tion had murdered Chancellor Dollfus in Vienna; but the coup was
suppressed in time and Hitler drew back when Mussolini mobilized
troops on the Brenner Pass as a warning against German aggression.
Four years later the Austrian government faced a wholly different
situation. Pressure from Germany had steadily increased, the growth
of the Austrian Nazis had gone on unchecked, while Mussolini, now an
active partner in the Rome-Berlin axis, could no longer be counted on
for help. In this extremity Dr. Schuschnigg, the Austrian Chancellor,
yielded to his advisers and went to Berchtesgaden for a conference with
Hitler on the Austro-German problem. Various accounts of what hap-
pened at that meeting have appeared. All agree, however, that Hitler
and his generals by the use of third degree tactics finally extorted from
the unhappy Austrian a pledge that an Austrian Nazi be put in charge
of the police force, with a seat on Schuschnigg's cabinet.
With Schuschnigg's return to Vienna events moved rapidly to a
climax. Seyzz-Inquart, the new minister of police played Hitler's
game by lifting all restrictions on Nazi demonstrations throughout the
little country. Schuschnigg, realizing that he had been duped, sought
to save the state from Nazi domination by holding a plebiscite. It was,
however, too late. Hitler taking advantage of a cabinet crisis in France
forced Schuschnigg's resignation on March 11th by threatening invasion
and on the following morning poured his troops across the Austrian
frontier.
Eh]
This brutal act represented the first serious breach in the terri-
torial settlement of 1919. That in itself was enough to send a wave of
alarm sweeping over the countries of Europe. Each of the smaller
states began to wonder whether it was to be the next victim of German
aggression.
Czechoslovakia was especially alarmed because only a few miles of
level land lay between Vienna (now in German hands) and the
Czech countryside. However, France and Soviet Russia, who were
bound by treaties to assist Czechoslovakia if she were attacked, declared
they would fulfill their obligations, and Britain suggested she might
fight if central Europe went to war. But the warning was so vague
that no one, least of all Germany, took the British statement seriously.
With the powers thus divided a dangerous crisis developed within
Czechoslovakia, where the Germans formed about a fourth of the
population. This minority was united by both economic and national
grievances, for they lived in industrial areas badly hit by the depression.
Under Konrad Henlein, a local Nazi leader, these groups had organized
a powerful political bloc and now began to agitate for autonomy. Across
the frontier the German propaganda machine broke out into a storm
of abuse of the Czechs. The Czech government sought to stave off
the danger of German intervention by offering concessions. But at
each offer Henlein simply raised the ante. By May he was even de-
manding that the government reverse its foreign policy, drop its al-
liance with France and Russia, and so become a part of Hitler's political
system. The Czech government naturally refused. When a few weeks
later German troop movements seemed to betoken an invasion, the
Czechs mobilized their army and received diplomatic support from
Britain, France, Russia and even Poland. For several days Europe
was on the verge of war; then the tension relaxed.
We know today that the action of the powers in May only post-
ponded the German-Czechoslovak crisis. All through the latter part of
the summer the Nazi press hurled insults at the Czechs for their al-
legedly barbarous mistreatment of the Sudeten Germans. In western
Germany thousands of laborers worked feverishly on the great fortified
line that would block invasion from France. Rumors spread that the
military authorities were calling up troops by the hundreds of thousands
on the pretext of preparing for the annual army manoeuvers in mid-
August. As the news of these developments leaked out, France and
Britain took counter measures; the French began to call up their own
reserves and the British fleet was ordered to be ready to take its war
stations.
But neither the British nor the French government was anxious to
go to war for the sake of Czechoslovakia. Instead they sought to
resolve the central European crisis by mediating between the Czech
government and Henlein's Nazi followers. The only result of these
efforts was to force Czechoslovakia to offer further concessions which,
Henlein, now in constant contact with Hitler, rejected. Still the British
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government persisted. On September 7th through an editorial in the
London Times it virtually yielded the game to Hitler and Henlein by
proposing the outright cession of the Sudeten area to Germany as the
best possible solution.
From that moment Hitler held all the cards, since Britain was ap-
parently no longer prepared to fight for the integrity of the Czech
state. He quickly seized his opportunity and at the great Nuremburg
Nazi rally threatened to intervene unless the Sudeten Germans were
allowed self-determination. His demands were followed by organized
rioting on the part of Henlein's followers. Mediation, it was evident,
had failed and once again Europe trembled on the brink of war.
In this emergency Chamberlain decided to appeal to Hitler in per-
son. A series of meetings followed at which the Nazi Chancellor
shocked the elderly prime minister by insisting on the immediate ces-
sion of the Sudetenland as the only alternative to a .German invasion.
Rather than run the risk of conflict, Britain and France agreed, forcing
the Czech government to accept the terms. On the first of October
after another crisis over the manner of transfer, Britain, France, Ger-
many and Italy settled the details at a conference in Munich.
The most that can be said for this settlement is that it averted war.
It did not bring permanent peace to Europe as Chamberlain naively
believed. On the one hand, it reduced Czechoslovakia to a small trun-
cated state of ten and a half million, thus giving Hitler control of the
upper Danube—the key to southeastern Europe. On the other hand,
it involved the destruction of the little Entente and the dissolution of
the coalition of powers which was forming against Germany in the latter
stages of the Czechoslovak crisis. Hitler's triumph was overwhelming.
Actually Munich ended only the first phase of the Czechoslovak
affair. Hardly was the agreement put into operation when new acts
of violence broke out in Central Europe. No sooner had Germany
taken its share of Czechoslovakia than Poland and Hungary forced the
helpless state to yield additional slices of territory to each of them.
Meanwhile, between constant pressure applied from Berlin and Nazi
instigated terrorist activities in Ruthenia and Slovakia, the mutilated
remains of the state threatened to break up.
In the spring of 1939 came the final showdown. First the province
of Slovakia was detached from the rest of the state and made independent
of the Prague government. Next, on the pretext of protecting Slovakia
from Czech outrages and brutalities, Germany served an ultimatum on
President Hacha of Czechoslovakia, who came to Berlin and there,
after a merciless three hour grilling, finally agreed to sign the death
warrant of his country's independence. German troops by the hundreds
of thousands poured across the frontier, and on March 15th, just a
year after his entry into Vienna, Hitler took possession of the ancient
castle of Prague.
The seizure of Czechoslovakia marked a turning point in the post
Munich period. At one blow Hitler had wrecked the Munich settlement
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and destroyed any remaining confidence in his pledged word. All talk
of appeasement abruptly subsided. Britain and France in desperation
at last determined to stand firm against aggression on the continent.
Now in all eastern Europe there was, aside from Russia, only one
nation that might conceivably block the German drive for Lebensraum,
and that was Poland. A week after occupying Prague Hitler turned to
the Baltic, seized the city of Memel from Lithuania and followed up
this move by demanding from Poland the restoration of Danzig and the
cession to Germany of a motor roadway across the Polish Corridor to
East Prussia. The implication of these demands was obvious. On
March 31st the British Government replied by announcing a pledge
of assistance to Poland if she were attacked or her independence threat-
ened. In April Britain and France took further steps toward the
creation of a stop-Hitler front by extending similar pledges to Greece
and Rumania. A little later the two great democratic powers initiated
conversations with Russia in an effort to draw the Soviet into a great
anti-Nazi coalition. Hitler responded by tearing up the Anglo-German
naval agreement of 1935 and the Polish-German treaty of mutual guar-
antee of 1934. Britain and France were bluntly told to mind their
own business by keeping out of affairs in eastern Europe.
At the beginning of the summer it still seemed possible that war
might be avoided, provided that Britain could succeed in convincing
Hitler that she would fight if he were to attack Poland. Unfortunately
British warning seriously, and rejected all proposals that he modify his
opinion of his Foreign Minister, Von Ribbentrop, refused to take the
British warning seriously, and rejected all proposals that he modify his
demands upon Poland. All through the latter part of the summer Ger-
man-Polish relations grew visibly worse as the Nazi leaders in Danzig
organized furious demonstrations against the Polish Government and
worked feverishly to arm their followers and prepare the city for pos-
sible attacks from Poland.
Then, while the world waited in suspense, suddenly the bottom was
knocked out of the Anglo-French negotiations with Russia by the an-
nouncement of a Soviet-German non-aggression treaty. The news, so
different from what observers had expected, came as a tremendous shock
to a world which had so often heard Hitler denounce the Bolshevists
as the enemies of civilization, or read of his schemes to seize the Russian
Ukraine. At one stroke the Nazi Chancellor had turned the tables on his
opponents by coming to terms with his bitterest foe who now promised
to remain neutral, leaving Germany free to attack and crush Poland
before aid could arrive from the west. The stop-Hitler plan had failed.
In a last desperate effort British diplomacy sought to find some
formula that would satisfy both Hitler and Poland, and thus avert the
impending catastrophe. But Hitler refused to negotiate. Just seven
days after Von Ribbentrop signed the German-Soviet pact in Moscow,
Nazi planes roared across the Prussian frontier and bombs began to
rain on the towns and cities of Poland. Britain and France issued
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ultimatums demanding that Germany should immediately recall her
armed forces, and upon her refusal declared war on the Reich. The
great war in Europe had begun.
Bruce T. McCully.
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THE LESSON OF FRANCE
n exposition of the circumstances leading to the collapse
^^H °f tne Third French Republic on July 10, 1940, constitutes
an indictment against the competence of French repre-
sentative government, and a warning to the remaining
democracies of the world. Whether French democracy could have
survived had the nation not suffered military defeat is a question
that will, no doubt, be a subject for endless debate; and it is cer-
tainly correct to assert that a Europe in arms, aggravated by an
ambitious Italy and an insatiable Germany, was the immediate
cause of her downfall. Nevertheless, economic dislocations, ac-
companied by social unrest, had before this assumed world-wide
proportions, and beginning as early as 1932, in the face of the
deepening depression, representative government in France had
in every case failed to deal successfully with her constantly re-
curring economic, and, later, her foreign problems. As her diffi-
culties mounted and crisis followed crisis, new cabinets were
formed and granted plenary powers, for limited periods, to deal
with the emergencies. But France seemed wholly unable to formu-
late any definite and continuing program that could command a
stable majority in her Parliament, wholly unable to develop a na-
tional unity and will capable of withstanding assaults from within
as well as assaults from without. Although faced with a powerful
national urge to safeguard her material interests, her intellectual
values, and her territorial integrity, she failed to unite in time in
a common purpose and with a common will.
The history, the temperament, the structural peculiarities of
the government, the traditions of France, all conspired to make
of her an extreme example of the weaknesses of the democratic
process when faced with a prolonged emergency. If French lead-
ership had not temporized with financial and social problems, if
the cupidity and prejudices of the people had been overcome, if
capital and business had been willing to support the popu-
lar front and workers had been satisfied with reasonable and
practical reforms—in short, if a far-seeing government had been
able to formulate and popularize a sound national policy, calling
for immediate sacrifice, perhaps, but with a real promise for her
future national welfare—then French democracy with all its struc-
tural weaknesses and outside pressures might have survived. When
faced with the threat of disaster, men seek order and security;
French democracy had failed to develop a self-discipline and leader-
ship capable of imposing the conditions necessary to their attain-
ment, and, with more hope than promise, France acceded to discip-
line and direction imposed from above.
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The important lesson for us to learn from the experience of
France is that there are certain inherent weaknesses in representa-
tive government, of which France offers but the most recent and
extreme example. One need not be labeled "Fascist" to admit the
difficulties, the delays, and the ineptitudes of democracy as it has
been confronted with the problems of the modern world. Fascism
would in all probability never have gained a foothold in Italy but
for the corruption and inefficiency of her Parliamentary regime.
The Weimar Constitution carefully avoided the supposedly struc-
tural weaknesses of the French system, and sought to avail itself
of the tested principles upon which the democratic processes in
England and the United States had successfully functioned. Yet,
there is a frightful and significant similiarity between the rise of
Nazism out of the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the fall
of the Third French Republic. It may be argued that these cir-
cumstances were brought about by economic distress and the ac-
companying social unrest, and these factors, if they did not ac-
tually plant the seed of Fascist revolution, certainly did provide
the medium in which it flourished. But the enduring qualities of
representative government will, in the long run, depend upon the
dispatch and intelligence with which it meets these conditions.
"Liberty, equality, fraternity" were the watchwords which con-
quered the old despotism of France, but slogans alone could not
preserve the new order. The world in which we live has de-
veloped into a complex society; the machine, the obliteration of
distance, the prompt exchange of ideas, the interaction of economic
forces require cooperation and collective action hardly consonant
with eighteenth century individualism. If democracy is to survive and
permanently replace revolution and despotism, it must recognize the diffi-
culties it faces and convince men of the essential soundness of its
institutions by finding solutions for its problems. It must devise
some means by which a balance can be maintained between that
which is called political and that which is called economic. It
must insure order and command confidence in the face of dynamic
changes such as are brought about by a new discovery, a techno-
logical advance, or a new ideology, and it must be adaptable enough
to adjust itself to these changes in a rational and orderly fashion.
French democracy either lacked the capacity to develop techniques
and social controls capable of dealing with the problems of this
modern world, or the will to accept them, and finally fell a prey to
attack from without because she had not conquered the enemy
within.
America is the last rampart of democracy. Even England,
with centuries of experience in the evolution of representative gov-
ernment, has been forced to abandon the normal processes of free
government in order that she might achieve a national unity and
efficiency capable of withstanding attack. So far, we have managed
to weather the storm of almost world-wide economic dislocations,
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and have turned deaf ears to the dynamic forces loosed by a new
revolutionary ideology. Nevertheless, we can find many less exag-
gerated counterparts of French mistakes, enough to serve us with
a grave warning. The preservation of our security has been easy
because we have been rich and powerful and well-insulated by
the oceans from the cross-currents of European forces. But the
spirit and the capacity of American democracy has yet to face its
supreme test. Increased taxes as a result of our mounting national
debt, our armanent program, and the expanding responsibilities of
the government for social reform ; severe economic disturbances
brought about by the loss of foreign markets and the abnormal
expansion of unproductive enterprise at home; the adjustment of
differences between economic groups ; a controlled currency, and
the probability that the government will be more and more driven
in the direction of a planned and managed economy ; the imminent
danger of war, and the almost certain world-wide economic col-
lapse as the aftermath of the present conflict—all of these forces
which we can foresee but which we can neither prevent nor avoid
will try our very souls and test the competence of our democracy.
We are better prepared for the ordeal than was France. We
enjoy a reserve of wealth and power that she did not possess.
The. multiplicity of parties in the French Parliament, even under
the most favorable circumstances, compelled government by coali-
tion groups, and this in turn resulted in a divided responsibility
and law-making by compromise. A lack of balance in powers
between the legislative and executive branches of the government
made the cabinet in reality a delegate of Parliament, subject to
every legislative whim, rather than an independent executive
branch, with the result that the executive direction of affairs
changed hands with a frequency that prevented the formulation and
execution of any continuing administrative leadership. Authori-
tarian government was not new to France, and the spirit of the
revolution burned undimmed, side by side with the Napoleonic
legend, and the remnants of monarchy. The new dynamic ideol-
ogies which surrounded her were in reality old doctrines and old
ideas in new dress, and, in her time of need when her democratic
processes seemed inadequate for their task, struck responsive
chords in French hearts. The structure of our democracy is bet-
ter designed to withstand the stresses and strains placed upon it.
The spirit and temperament of American democracy lacks that
emotional and revolutionary individualism reminiscent of 1789, and
we have already indicated our willingness to share with our gov-
ernment some of our privileges and responsibilities as individuals.
As I interpret Tuesday's endorsement of the past seven and a
half years of the New Deal, it is a declaration by a vast number
of the American people that they no longer believe that the doc-
trine of the "laissez faire" will guarantee our security and insure
our prosperity. I believe our vote indicated at least our patience
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with the trial and error methods of democracy, and most impor-
tant of all, our willingness to give continued support to what ap-
pears to us to be a capable and patriotic leadership during a pe-
riod of national emergency.
These are all important and encouraging factors. But in seek-
ing to draw a lesson from the disaster of France we must continue
to bear in mind that the breakdown of French democracy was a
spiritual breakdown rather than a structural one. Confronted
with economic and social problems at home, and faced with aggres-
sion by foreign foes, she lacked that patriotic spirit which com-
pels men to place a common national welfare above their indi-
vidual desires and well-being. Divided into cliques of, for the most
part, self-interested groups, and having lost confidence in the com-
petence of her democracy, she refused to give it that measure of
support and patience without which it could not hope to find a
solution for her problems. In her hour of greatest need she was
disunited; and, divided, she fell.
What the immediate future holds for America no man can
say; but there can be no doubt that in the days that lie ahead our
courage, our spirit, our very faith in democracy, will face its su-
preme test. If we will patiently and with an open mind examine
the proposals by which government may develop techniques to
deal with the problems of modern society; if we will stand firm
before the reactionary demands whether of a monopolistic industry
or unreasonable labor, and refuse to be stampeded by the unreason-
able and impossible demands of political and pressure groups,
organized solely on the basis of economic self-interest; if, in eco-
nomic adversity as well as in prosperity, our faith in the demo-
cratic way of life remains unshaken; if we will be satisfied with
tolerable efficiency in government in the belief that that is the
best we can achieve and remain free; if we can give the lie to
Mussolini's denunciation of the "bourgeois spirit" as the "spirit
of satisfaction and accommodation, the tendency toward scepticism
and compromise, the love of ease and a career"; if individually
and in groups we shall have submerged our hates and hopes and
ambitions for the common weal, and shall have self-imposed those
conditions of discipline which will insure "the preservation of the
delicate balance between order and liberty so that the former may
not turn into oppression or the latter into license"—then our
democracy will have stood its supreme test. It will have conquered
where France's failed.
Charles J. Duke, Jr.
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THE CIVIL LIBERTIES IN A TIME OF CRISIS
he civil liberties surely present to a sorely troubled America
one of its most perplexing problems. They are, most of us
feel, among our most precious possessions; they are equally,
it is claimed, our greatest weakness. We feel ourselves set in
sharp contrast with—destined perhaps to ultimate conflict with—societies
which disregard the civil liberties and appear to gain by so doing. The
gain may be momentary—and merely military—but it is very real. We
see our way of life—the free way, as we call it—threatened by its
very freedom; we see nations which have also treasured the civil
liberties caught far behind their enemies in effectiveness and decisiveness
of action. So we who are dedicated to a strong Union are asking our-
selves whether in the present crisis the civil liberties must be let go.
At the same time, we see that in so far as that is done we take on the
complexion of the societies we dislike. If we change in this respect,
we give up American freedom—if we don't change, we stand the risk
of giving up America. This is, I think, the face which the present
situation offers to the majority of puzzled Americans today.
Now in general, though by no means unanimously, the American
community seems to me to favor altering our practice of civil liberties,
to restraining speech and other forms of expression so as to bring them
into line with the main demand for national security. "If we must
choose," runs this view, "between America itself and a free America,
we'll save America first and then work back as we may to American
freedom." And from this view I want this evening to record a very
emphatic dissent. We do not need, I think, to stop being free in order
to be strong. We need not so separate and oppose to one another
the national strength and the civil liberties. We do not need to con-
cede that American theory on those liberties has not always been clear
—
that in it are notions supporting the idea that civil freedom and national
power are essentially opposed. But running through our social theory
has persisted another strain which has asserted not opposition but mutual
support and assistance. This is, as I shall try to show, a permanently
valid element in America's social philosophy. And if this can be main-
tained, it must follow that in the present crisis we must not restrict but
rather promote as arduously as we may the practice of civil freedom.
America must not change—must not give up—its theory of civil
liberties. What is that theory ? Where do we find it stated with clarity
and consistency? Where, in particular, do we find it stated in a way
that establishes its continuity with our concept of the national well-
being? There are two accounts of it which I want briefly to consider,
associated with the thinking of Thomas Jefferson and of Mr. Justice
Holmes. Neither will, I think, completely answer our quest, but each
offers considerations which cannot be ignored.
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The Jeffersonian theory is that of the natural rights of men, to
carry on those activities which their native capacities assure them. It
asserts the right of individual man, independently of society, to use the
faculties of speech and thought and worship as his reason bids. It is a
stirring declaration—this affirmation of individual rights; and it is of
course deeply set in our national heritage.
Yet the Jeffersonian theory
—
popular though it still may be—is
not an acceptable theory of the civil liberties. It sees those liberties as
individual concerns whereas they are clearly social, in their origin and
their exercise. For men must, to talk significantly, talk in a common
language to other men. Again, the natural rights theory in its literal
form admits of no restraint on speech or publication. This rigidity and
this excess of individualism preclude it from affording a basis for the
civil liberties. It has been of immense value in suggesting their sig-
nificance for American Life. But it will not, I think, provide an account
of the civil liberties with which we may face the present crisis.
Nor, as I think, is this account to be found in the more recent
theory which has found expression in the writings of Mr. Justice Holmes.
As he saw them, the civil liberties are to be protected," not as
private rights, but as public instruments. They are, he argued, the
only way society has of discovering the truth—and accordingly their
usefulness to society is very great. It is for this reason that I call this
theory of Holmes the public utility theory of the civil liberties. Between
1935 and 1939, certainly, it was the prevailing theory in the Supreme
Court. During the war of 1917 it was—in the Holmes form—definitely
a minority view in the court—as in the country. But following its logic
Mr. Justice Holmes wrote some of America's most impressive opinions
in defense of civil liberties.
The public utility theory does not affirm an absolute right to speak
or to publish as one thinks best. It acknowledges that besides truth-
seeking there are other activities useful to the public—and that on behalf
of these speech and press must on occasion be checked. Thus newspapers
may not print matters relating to movements of troops in time of war.
The civil liberties must be weighed and balanced against other socially
useful procedures. This does not mean that Holmes thought of the civil
liberties as of little import. They were for him an essential element in
that experimental search for truth which makes meaningful all human
existence, social or individual. They must not, accordingly, be restrained
except as they offer a "clear and present" danger to the other pressing
purposes of government. In general they are to be given free rein,
and it was only on specific and immediate opposition to the draft law in
1917 that Holmes sanctioned restraint. General statements opposing
war or decrying military service did not, Holmes felt, constitute a "clear
and present danger", and they might well help to clarify America's aims
and techniques in carrying on the war.
In this theory as in that of Jefferson there is much that is true,
and yet I must say that I find it also unsatisfactory. For despite its
concern for the civil liberties it does not clearly define the field within
mi
which they are to be protected. It does not make clear the meaning of
"clear and present danger"—at least, its own followers do not agree in
many cases on what that means. And the reason for this is, again,
that it sees the civil liberties as procedures distinct from the national
strength and so as something to be weighed against that. Just how the
balancing is to be done is not made clear. Consequently, in time of crisis
there is, under the public utility theory, a strong tendency to give up
the civil liberties and to concentrate upon a supposed different task
—
that is, the carrying on of national defense.
This is, of course, a very incomplete discussion of both the Holmes
and the Jefferson theories. I think, however, that it is fair to criticize
them both on the ground that they do not establish real continuity be-
tween the civil liberties and the national well-being. And so I want
briefly to sketch a further account which may provide that continuity.
The most striking feature of the present crisis is the sense it has
awakened in Americans of a common peril, a common urgency. Cen-
tral in our troubled view is a resolution that we shall not relinquish
our procedure of determining American policy by what Americans want
—by what is the common sense of American opinion upon American
problems. This setting gives, as I see it, the proper background for
the understanding of the civil liberties. They are, surely, the ways
in which the public mind, the public opinion, of America, is formed
and made aware of itself. In them we become conscious of common
interests and formulate common policy. They are, then, the ways in
which society comes to a decision. They are not, by the same token,
involved in the carrying out of such decision—their concern is with
opinions, with advocacy, not with actions. So far, then, as speech and
thought are elements in the formation of national policy, they must, I
think, be entirely free.
The one demand we are all feeling is that we as a nation achieve
strength and decisiveness. And the civil liberties as here interpreted
are essentially connected with that demand, for a community cannot
achieve strength except as its decisions express the opinions, the wills,
of all its members. When in hysterical fright or excess of caution it
silences any of these, it deprives itself of their support and also wastes
itself in activities of repression. When on the other hand it admits to
public debate any and all who would contribute to the joint decision,
it achieves such scope and balance as is neither upset by danger nor
overcome by novelty. It has within itself the resourcefulness that
reflects the variety of its members and the plasticity and toughness that
rise in the resolution of their differences. And to the forming of such
a public mind the preservation of the civil liberties, equally, for all, is
indispensable.
I said before that this theory is concerned with expressions and with
advocacy, not with actions, and I want again to stress that point. We
must protect expression which genuinely plays into the reasoned form-
ing of the public mind—whether such expression agrees with the pre-
vailing national policy or not. Conversely, we are not on the theory
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committed to protection of immediate and passionate incitement to riot.
Such incitement is action just as surely as the bloody violence that
follows it. Civil liberty does not protect that, any more than it protects
the organizing of armed or semi-military organizations to reflect with-
out question the commands of a foreign or domestic leader.
In the civil liberties as essential elements in forming the public
mind, then, we do have a theory which shows their continuity with
national effectiveness. It involves, I think, that government do more
than simply keep hands off discussion—it requires that government
promote full discussion and secure expression of all views, especially
those of dissent. Open discussion is not what we have to fear, whether
by pacifists or communists or fascists. They can threaten the nation only
as they are not heard and are driven to underground activity. They
can, positively, assist the nation if they are permitted to contribute their
views to the national attitude. And only a government which in that





ndustrial mobilization holds as important a place in national
defense as that occupied by the selective service and training
of the armed forces. This was one of the outstanding facts
learned in 1917-18, and more forcibly brought to our attention
by the tragic events of the past months. In 1917-18 our plans for in-
dustrial mobilization were improvised, which resulted in wasting valuable
time and resources. The Council of National Defense, created in 1916,
failed largely because it confused its real functions, which were co-
ordination and advice, with activities that involved administrative detail.1
Out of the Council's failure there emerged the War Industries Board
which did not realize its full powers until President Wilson made Mr.
Baruch, chairman, and vested him with part of the President's vast
war powers. "The ultimate decision of all questions, except the deter-
mination of prices," the President wrote "should rest always with the
Chairman, the other members acting in a cooperative and advisory
capacity."2
Both the Army and Navy departments are fully aware of the im-
portance of the place that industrial mobilization occupies in national
defense, and for twenty years they have been planning for it. Their
latest plan was issued in 1939.3
The recent turn of affairs has made it necessary to translate plans
into administrative action. Last year (1939) the President appointed
the War Resources Board, composed of seven well known industrial
leaders. Mr. Stettinius was its chairman. Labor was not represented
on the Board, an omission that aroused considerable resentment among
labor leaders. In less than two months, however, the Board made its
unpublished report and was disbanded.
The National Defense Council, and the National Defense Advisory
Commission appointed, May 1940, by the President have their legal
basis in the Army Appropriation Act passed by the Congress in 1916.4
By the terms of this Act, the Council of National Defense which con-
sist of the Secretary of War, of Navy, of Interior, of Agriculture, of
Commerce, and of Labor shall coordinate industry and resources for
the national security. Upon the Council's nomination, the President
appoints the advisory commission, consisting of seven persons, each
distinguished in some field of industry and labor relations.
It is understood, of course, that the National Defense Advisory
Commission is not an executive or a super-administrative agency au-
1 Willoughby, W. F., Govt. Organization in War Time and After, pp. 10-21.
z Ibid., pp. 74-76.
3 Industrial Mobilization Plan, 1939.
4 39 Stat. 649 (1916).
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thorized to issue commands, to make contracts, to buy supplies, or to
hire labor. Work of this kind is handled by the existing departments
of government. The Commission has often been described as an advisory
agency. This statement should not, however, create the erroneous im-
pression that the Commissioners are figureheads, closeted in marble
offices, who out of the profundity of their knowledge and experience
merely give advice. The Commission has the very positive function of
coordinating and facilitating the defense program. Each Commissioner
has a clear-cut, well defined area of responsibility. Mr. Stettinius, the
head of the Industrial Materials Division, coordinates and facilitates
the flow to the factories of raw materials essential to national defense.
Mr. Knudsen, head of the Production Division, steps into the picture
where raw materials are fabricated. His job is to see that the Nation's
productive machine is geared into the defense program. Mr. Sidney
Hillman, head of the Labor Division, does not find jobs or train workers,
but he coordinates the activities of agencies in the established depart-
ments through which a reservoir of labor is located and trained. Mr.
Hillman is ably assisted by the Labor Policy Advisory Committee com-
posed of representatives of the C. I. O., the A. F. of L., and the R. R.
brotherhoods. Mr. Chester Davis collaborates with the Department of
Agriculture in seeing that agricultural resources are available for de-
fense. Through this division thought is being given to the very im-
portant matter of post-defense adjustment. It is not only a good
strategic policy to locate certain defense projects away from the con-
gested industrial centers, but it will facilitate the inevitable adjustments
that come after demobilization. The munitions plant located at Radford,
Virginia, is a good example of location for economic as well as for
strategic reasons. The matter of locating a powder plant will, of course,
involve some other matters of personal security. For instance, in the
numerous letters the Advisory Commission gets from public-spirited
citizens requesting favors for their communities, one was from a man
who asked that a powder factory be located in the next town. To get
back to the Commission. Mr. Ralph Budd, head of the Transportation
Division, coordinates the country's transportation system so that defense
supplies will be moved quickly. Mr. Budd says that the transportation
system is ample for all emergencies, and is not likely to break down as
in 1917-18, necessitating government operation. 5 In fairness to the
private owners, it should be stated that a large factor in the break-down
was failure to load and unload the cars promptly. The complaint was
made that the cars were used for warehouses. In fairness to the Rail-
road Administrator it should be said that order was restored, and the
supplies were moved. Both Mr. Henderson and Miss Elliot, head of
the Consumer Protection and the Price Stabilization Divisions, respec-
tively, are interested in prices. Miss Elliot is especially concerned with
prices of basic consumer articles. She cooperates with both public
5 Radio Address, October 3, 1940.
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and private organizations concerned with consumer problems.
6 Mr.
Henderson observes the general price trends, and suggests procedures
to prevent unwarranted increases. 7 Government price fixing by statutory
or by administrative fiat has not started, and it is the hope that rigid
and sometimes arbitrary controls of this nature will not be necessary.
Procedures now used do not control, but one might say they are designed
to subdue or to influence prices. Investigation, conference, publicity
supported by public opinion, the spacing of purchases, and control of
scare advertising have so far prevented any unhealthy increase in the
prive level. This is a notable accomplishment, in view of the eight
billion dollars of contracts, that have been awarded in four months, the
largest peace time spending in the country's history. Mr. Donald M.
Nelson, who was originally appointed as Coordinator of Defense Pur-
chases, is now Administrator of Priorities and Director of Small Busi-
ness Activities. The importance of his role in the National Defense
Program would easily give him the rank of a Commissioner. As a
matter of fact, he has been mentioned as a possible Defense Administra-
tor to coordinate defense activities on the industrial front. 8
This question of reorganizing the National Defense Advisory Com-
mission under a single responsible administrator has already stirred
considerable comment. Before the heat of the recent campaign had
died down, and before reason had mounted above our emotional barom-
eter the suggestion was made in all seriousness that it would be a fine
gesture of national unity if the leader of the loyal opposition were made
chairman. In thinking about executive agencies, one is quite likely to
rely strongly on the pyramid or hierarchical organizational pattern. In
other words he thinks in terms of coordination by hierarchy where the
lines of control run upward and converge in the hands of an administra-
tor who is therefore in a position to enforce coordination by disciplinary
measures, if necessary. To state this principle in its bald form, of
course, is to show that it would not work one minute with as distin-
guished an agency as the National Defense Advisory Commission. In
the current discussion of a single responsible head for the Commission,
an important point overlooked is that one of the best coordinating
devices is the dominance of the idea, and certainly in this emergency
the idea is defense. An idea will create miracles in coordination where
dependence on hierarchy will fall flat. If one really wanted to get
argumentative about the chairmanship of the National Defense Advisory
Commission, he might deny that there is need for one, inasmuch as the
President of the United States is the Chairman. As Mr. Knudsen says :9
"The President is our boss." Twice a week the council meet as a unit,
and once a week they report to the President. Mr. McReynolds, the
6 Harriet Elliott, Radio Address, September 26, 1940.
7 Leon Henderson, Address before Herald Tribune Forum, N. Y., October
23, 1940.
8 United States News, November 15, 1940.
9 W. S. Knudsen, Address before Conference of Mayors. N. Y., September
20, 1940.
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administrative assistant to the President, is the Commission's secretary
and presides at their bi-weekly meetings. The expert in executive
management might say that the chief executive upon whom the burden
of a complex government rests heavily might simplify his work by
reducing the span of attention. In other words, it is easier to concen-
trate one's attention on one than on seven or eight important subjects.
A chairman, or an Administrator of National Defense would reduce
the chief executive's span of attention from seven to eight to one im-
portant purpose. Reference has been made to the fact that our 1917-18
experience shows that success was attained only after President Wilson
made Mr. Baruch, Chairman of the War Industries Board. But one
should also remember that was done after we were at war and after
the advisory council had become an executive agency. At present the
National Defense Advisory Commission is an advisory, coordinating,
and facilitating agency. It has no thaumaturgic powers. It is not an
executive agency solely responsible for getting things done. In the
event that it becomes an executive organ, and probably before that time,
a chairman will be appointed. A strong case can be made for giving
the civilian National Defense Advisory Commission complete executive
responsibility for supplying materials, and have the Army and Navy
Departments, which are now awarding contracts, confine their attention
to planning military strategy.
Another matter of almost the same interest as creating a National
Defense Administrator, is that of whether the defense effort will result
in setting up new administrative establishments. On this point the
Industrial Mobilization Plan of 1939 says :10 "Since the functions to be
accomplished are new and temporary, entirely new and separate agen-
cies, directly responsible to the President, should be created for indus-
trial mobilization in time of a major war. Reliance should not be placed
on existing governmental departments and officers unless the functions
to be used are peace-time as well as war-time responsibilities. Usually
the functions of existing departments and agencies are defined by law
and custom and are designed to serve only a social structure based upon
a peace-time economy."
One might say, of course, that the defense effort should not be
jeopardized by reliance on existing administrative machinery if new
instruments keenly alive to their responsibility will do the job better.
On the other hand, one must also consider that administrative estab-
lishments of control have been increased and have been improved since
1917-18. If you run back in your mind to that year, you will find that
both the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Trade Commission
were in their infancy. They had hardly cut their teeth of control. The
Securities Exchange Commission, the F. C. C, the T. V. A., the United
States Employment Service and several other well known labor agencies
had not been established. The splendid contribution of the Department
10 See Industrial Mobilization Plan, Revision of 1939, in Tobin, H. J. and
Bidwell, P. W., Mobilising Civilian America, pp. 237-257.
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of Agriculture to the science of public administration had not been
made. Since 1917, the R. F. C, the Maritime Commission and the
Federal Power Commission have stabilized and increased both their
promotional and regulatory powers.
Today all these agencies are cooperating with the National Defense
Advisory Commission in this tremendously important task of industrial
mobilization for national defense.
The problem of industrial mobilization for defense cannot be solved
by organizational charts and by the allocation of duties among key men
in the pattern of government. Administrative techniques for control
of industry must be developed, and must be operated effectively. These
methods of control are : priorities, commandeering, industrial conscrip-
tion, licensing, procurement, and price control. Several of these are
now in use. There is legal basis for the others, and they will be used
if the present defense effort should unfortunately become a war effort.
Then, when happily it is all over, and there is a complete psychological
let-down, we might save ourselves some of the miseries that follow
supreme efforts of this kind by the skilful and unselfish use of proper
administrative controls to readjust our demobilizing forces.
James E. Pate.
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INDUSTRIAL CONTROL IN TIME OF WAR
88
he united states has probably gone farther in instituting war-
time economic controls than any other non-warring nation out-
side of pre-1939 Germany. Actual participation in war would
not so much involve setting up new controls as extending and
implementing machinery already set up by the National Defense Ad-
visory Committee. It is timely, therefore, to review the objectives of
war-time control of economic life, the possible techniques available, the
extent to which these techniques are already in use, and their probable
impact upon the economy of this country. We must be careful to con-
sider not only the immediate effect of these war-time controls but also
the obstacles which they may place in the way of an orderly post-war
transition to a peace economy. There is grave danger that we may
forget that no war lasts forever and that what we do during the war
period and the way in which we do it may ease or make more difficult
the always troublesome task of beating swords into ploughshares.
The basic objective of a system of industrial control during war-
time is, of course, to win the war. More specifically, the economic
system must be so regulated that it will produce guns, powder, tanks,
airplanes, battleships and consumers goods in sufficient quantities to
supply the expanding military and naval forces. The second objective
is to soften the blow upon normal economic life as much as possible.
It is obvious that the first objective is paramount during the war period
itself, but that the latter objective becomes all-imporant for the long pull.
Two classes of obstacles obstruct attempts to secure adequate sup-
plies of war goods. The first is industry's slowness in meeting the new
conditions of demand. The second is that civilian demand tends to
compete with military demand. Steel mills produce girders for private
buildings and sheets for automobile bodies as well as shells and tanks.
Both soldiers and civilians require food, and shoes. As the war
develops and industry and employment expands, civilian purchasing
power increases. This intensifies the competition between civilian and
military demand. In the absence of governmental control, prices shoot
up. The government has to pay more for its war goods, thus com-
plicating the problem of war finance, and encounters shortages of es-
sential goods on every hand. During the last war, not only did the
United States government compete with civilians for industrial prod-
ucts, but the Army, Navy, other government agencies and the purchas-
ing agencies of allied governments engaged in a merry scramble for
goods, each bidding against the others.
Price increases are further stimulated by rising costs during war-
time. As prices begin to rise, living costs go up. Wage-earners rightly
insist that wages should keep pace. Labor shortages because of army
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enlistments and increased demand for labor give unions the bargaining
power with which to force wage increases which frequently go beyond
the point necessary to meet the higher living costs. Longer work hours
and the use of inexperienced workers to meet the abnormal demand for
greater production tend to lower the efficiency of the labor force. Strikes
make their appearance and add their very considerable bit to produc-
tion costs. The Vultee Aircraft strike in California, settled with a
considerable increase in wage rates two days ago, and the current
aluminum workers strike in Pennsylvania are typical examples of war-
time labor troubles. A further factor causing higher production costs
is the fact that higher prices tend to bring out of retirement obsolete,
inefficient plants and equipment which under normal circumstances would
be unable to cover costs. Higher costs, in turn, intensify the tendency
toward higher prices brought about by competition between civilian
and military demands. This upward spiral not only makes it difficult
for war supplies to be secured at reasonable prices but also creates
serious shortages of goods for civilians and breeds economic and social
maladjustments, which weaken civilian morale.
In order to develop adequate supplies for its military program
and to avoid morale-shattering maladjustments between prices and costs
throughout the economic structure, governments have experimented with
various types of industrial controls. They can be discussed under the
following five heads: (1) taxation. (2) priorities; (3) price control;
(4) rationing of consumers goods; (5) government operation of in-
dustry.
Taxation not only produces revenue but serves also as a type of
industrial control. It transfers purchasing power from civilians to the
government and thus automatically lessens the extent to which civiilan
demand competes with military demand. Discriminatory taxes upon
non-essential industries may prevent their expansion and thus divert
capital and labor to industries essential to the war. Heavy taxes upon
war profits and excess profits return to the government large blocks of
purchasing power which the government, in effect, has created. More-
over, it improves the morale of poorly paid soldiers and sailors and of
the working classes to know that the government is preventing small
groups of individuals from profiting disproportionately because of the
war. The effectiveness of taxation as a means of industrial control,
however, is limited by its delay in becoming effective.
The United States is using the tax method of industrial control to
a moderate degree, as new defense taxes went into effect last July and
Congress has recently passed an excess profits tax. Additional taxes
appear to be inevitable in the near future. While the announced aim
of the new defense taxes and the probable primary objctive of those
which will develop in the coming months is revenue, if they remain in
effect for several years, they will undoubtedly tend to curtail civilian
demand and thus tend to shift labor and capital into war industries.
An interesting variant of the tax device is the "deferred pay" sys-
tem suggested by John Maynard Keynes, the English economist. This
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calls for the government withholding from wage-earners all war-time
income above a certain low exemption, borrowing these forced savings
at 2y2% interest, and refraining from paying any principal or interest
to the workers until after the war. This both prevents price inflation
during the war through curtailing consumer demand for non-military
goods but it also releases purchasing power during the post-war period
of unemployment and economic distress. The difficulty, of course,
would lie in persuading wage-earners to forego high wages during the
war period and in administering any such system which involves mil-
lions of accounts between government and individuals. It has not been
used to any great degree even in England as yet and is unlikely to be
used here.
The most effective type of industrial control is the priority sys-
tem. It involves the listing of economic products and processes in order
of importance in carrying on a war and the granting of prior rights to
raw materials, capital, transportation service, and, perhaps, labor sup-
plies to those industries which are at the top of the list. In addition,
it involves the issuance of specific priority orders whenever necessary
to keep the essential war products flowing into the armed forces.
Delicate administrative problems are involved in distinguishing between
essential and non-essential industries, in determining which plants in a
given industry are to receive priorities, and in determining what non-
military products may be produced. Just last week, the Priorities Board
of the National Defense Advisory Commission was asked by the War
Department to stop the production of commercial transport planes in
order to push military production. So vehement was the opposition of
plane manufacturers, air transport companies, and other persons who
claim that the maintenance of a sound commercial air transport system
is in itself a national defense asset that the Board referred the matter
to President Roosevelt. The extent to which priorities control depends
upon public opinion and moral suasion is indicated by the President's
statement to the effect that he was sure that the transport companies
themselves would be desirous of refraining from expanding their equip-
ment at a time when the production of military planes was so vital.
Whether or not the Priorities Board of the Defense Commission can
be effective without greater legal power as war needs become greater
is doubtful. Many observers believe that our whole industrial defense
program will bog down unless more specific legal power is given to a
centralized defense agency.
Experience with run-away prices during previous crises has
prompted all countries involved in this war to take steps to prevent
such a condition. Charles O. Hardy, in his recent Brookings Institu-
tion study entitled War-time Control of Prices, holds that such war-
time inflation is not inherent in meeting war needs and that sound
policies coupled with properly coordinated administrative machinery can
keep prices down. He warns, however, that price controls must be
instituted early, before price inflation has had a chance to get started.
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The fact that prices have not risen to any great degree during the
recent months of industrial expansion incident to defense is due largely
to the fact that the program was launched at a time when our produc-
tion facilities were being operated at much less than full capacity. There
is still enough unutilized capacity to make possible considerable expan-
sion without any need for price increases. Dr. Hardy concludes, how-
ever, that rising prices can be prevented only through making certain
policies effective. In the first place, the Army and Navy must be
prevented from competing with each other in the market on a price
basis. Contracts should be entered into with producers which merely
yield a reasonable return rather than the abnormally high returns which
the abnormal market conditions would yield in the presence of uncon-
trolled bidding. Much progress has already been made toward co-
ordinating military and naval purchases. Second, instead of inducing
high-cost, inefficient producers to come back into production through
higher prices and then using excess profits taxes to return to the gov-
ernment the profits realized by the efficient producers because of the
high prices, prices should be kept just high enough to yield a reasonable
return to efficient producers. If the plant capacity of the efficient
producers cannot be expanded rapidly enough to meet the demands for
war goods, the obsolete, high-cost plants of the sub-marginal producers
can be brought into production by outright government subsidies which
would be terminated as soon as the war demand ended. While the
administrative difficulties of such a program would be serious, they
would be more than offset by the advantages of avoiding a distorted
price structure and the bringing back into the market for an indefinite
period poorly-equipped, sub-marginal producers who would probably
press for the continuance of artificially high prices during the post-war
period.
A third requisite for preventing price inflation would be to prevent
wage increases except where necessary in the interests of health and
efficiency. Price control without wage control would obviously be un-
workable. Here is probably the most difficult aspect of price control.
To win the goodwill and support of labor during a period of war-
time without granting wage increases is a tremendous task. The
recent flat statement by the general counsel of the CIO, at a forum
conducted by the Savings Bank Journal, that labor would not be content
merely to adjust wages to living costs but that it will insist on increases
in wages in order to share in the profits of war-time industrial ex-
pansion illustrates the difficulties involved. The need for developing
more adequate labor policies and fair, expert arbitration machinery to
make such policies effective is imperative.
A fourth step which must be taken, according to Mr. Hardy, if
price inflation is to be avoided, is to finance the war as far as possible
through taxes and loans paid for out of current income rather than
through the type of credit expansion based on Liberty Bond campaigns,
backed by excessive loans by banks to purchasers of such bonds, which
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was used during the last World War. This merely reiterates the point
made a few minutes ago to the effect that taxation is a means of divert-
ing civilian purchasing power to the Treasury and thus depresses civilian
demand and prices.
Rationing of consumer goods has been a major phase of economic
control both in Germany and England. There is no reason to believe
that it would not become necessary in the United States, even with its
vastly richer resources, if we should actually go to war. It might be-
come necessary for some commodities even if we merely continue in
our present state of "non-belligerency", suspended between peace and
war. We Americans don't like rationing, but if basic goods should be-
come scarce and price control should prevent normal increases in price,
we, like other peoples, would probably prefer rationing in order to
prevent persons with good connections, money, and plenty of time to
stand in lines outside of stores from having their wants satisfied to a
greater degree than those less fortunately situated. Rationing, of
course, would be one type of economic control which would normally
disappear soon after the end of the war.
The remaining type of war-time industrial control-government oper-
ation—has been used because of insufficient flow of essential goods,
labor troubles, lack of cooperation with government officials, and in-
sufficient coordination of the various units in an industry. American
railroads, telephone, and telegraph companies, and inland waterway barge
lines were taken over during the last World War. It is not unlikely
that power lines, munitions plants, and other essential industries might
accompany transport and communication systems into government hands
if we should become further involved in war. Horst Mendershausen,
the Swiss-American writer of the recent book The Economics of War,
believes that public operation of basic utilities is one type of war-time
industrial control that might continue indefinitely after the close of the
war. The TVA development and the rather sorry financial plight of
the privately-owned railroads during much of the past twenty years
lends support to this view.
Regardless of the extent to which we apply such war-time controls
as taxation, priorities, price control, rationing, and government opera-
tion, two things are certain. One is that further involvement in war
will cause ordinary economic activity to be subordinated to the promo-
tion of national defense. The other is that pre-war conditions are his-
tory into which the United States cannot relapse at the close of the war.
Perhaps we had better take a good look around us and soberly estimate
the chances our various social, political, and economic institutions have
of surviving the revolution which inevitably accompanies war and then
set ourselves to the task of erecting bulwarks to protect those of our
institutions which we believe to be worthy of perpetuating.
Charles F. Marsh.
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THE FUTURE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE
|o persons aware of their history, the British Empire is no
accident. An institution over three hundred years old
does not vanish in the face of a brief assault. The Empire
will last as long as its creative forces operate, and those
forces will disappear no more speedily than they came into being.
When you wake tomorrow morning you will learn of British
freighters plowing through distant seas as they have in the past.
Some may have been sunk as others are built, some will change
their destinations or their cargoes, some may even change their
registry. But the seas of the world are still a highway of com-
merce and power. The maritime nations of the world will police
those seas very much as they have in the past. Those maritime
nations will be the same nations tomorrow as today and yesterday.
The British Empire is a great league of states with a com-
mon interest in the sea. At the core stands Britain herself. As
an industrial island on the flank of Europe she finds naval power
essential to her existence. Only thus can she assure herself the
lifeblood of commerce. Only thus can she assure herself freedom
from domination by the military masters of the continent. Other
nations have shared Britain's hopes and fears, and so have joined
her in alliance for freedom of commerce. Holland, once aspirant
for naval power herself, can hold the Dutch East Indies only
with the aid of British sea power. And similarly the ships of
Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, the ships of France, Spain, Portu-
gal, and Italy—and indeed the ships of the United States, have
long sailed the seas under the protection of the British navy.
The rise of the New World in the past century took place under
the protection of the British fleet. The entry of the East into
world commerce came under British auspices. For a hundred
years the maritime world has been a British world.
The overwhelming fear of the commercial and maritime na-
tions of the world has been military domination by a continent
power. Throughout history military conquest by great land powers
has been accompanied by pillage and servitude with a restriction
of commerce. A really great continental power, such as Russia,
is irresponsible, since she can not be coerced by blockade or even
invaded with much success. On the other hand, if there is to be
domination at all, the supremacy most acceptable to maritime
nations is that of an insular power which, itself, shares the interest
in commerce and can be coerced by blockade if opposed by a
sufficient coalition.
Britain's rule of the seas has not always been beyond criticism,
but no abuse has ever been so serious as to bring about an op-
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posing league of all the maritime states of the world. Britain's
rule of the seas has always been preferable to mastery by a
great military and land power. Had British rule been intolerable,
we would not have remained at peace with her during the one
hundred and twenty-five years in which we rose from infancy to
our present position as one of the most powerful political and
economic entities in the world.
The British Empire, then, consists not merely of the colonies
and dependencies and the British Commonwealth of Nations. It
consists also of the whole sea-faring world, including ourselves.
Some parts of the Empire have been invaded by enemies. Some
parts have awkwardly and temporarily associated themselves with
enemies of the Empire. But by and large the maritime world still
stands together in opposition to military conquest by any great
land power.
To say that the Empire still stands firm is not to say that
the Empire always has been and always will be organized as it
is today.
Three British Empires have passed before us in three hundred
years, and a fourth is being hammered out upon the anvil of war.
The first Empire was based upon a mercantilist philosophy. We
in America shattered that Empire in 1776. The Second Empire,
dating from 1776 to 1914, was an Empire of autonomous dominions
joined together by political consultation. The third Empire, dat-
ing from 1914 to 1940, was an Empire composed of independent
states as well as crown colonies. Each step has been away from
the close political control of London. Each step has been in the
direction of a loose league of independent states. Today we stand
upon the threshold of the fourth Empire—a world league of com-
mercial and maritime states with its main industrial and naval
strength centered in the United States.
The power of London in the world has been diminishing for
more than fifty years. London originally owed her power to her
geographic position on the flank of Europe and to her primacy in
the industrial revolution, a primacy which was made possible by
her iron and coal and by her capital accumulations from the earlier
commercial revolution. The industrial growth of the non-Euro-
pean world, the decline in British resources, and the shift in the
geographic center of commerce from the North Sea to the Atlantic
and Pacific Oceans, have all made London relatively less important.
Ever since 1914 a declining Britain has increasingly used her sav-
ings to maintain her level of living. The Dominions have de-
manded an increasing share in the making of policy. Ireland and
India have made progress toward economic as well as political
independence. The United States has established naval equality.
The development of aircraft and submarines has reduced Britain's
strategic and tactical advantages, though she bids fair to add air
supremacy to naval predominance. Finally, the World War of
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1914 to 1918 did untold damage to the generation of political
leaders destined to assume control during these trying years.
Taken together, there is no doubt that these changes spell
London's surrender of her position in the world. But the Empire
still lives as the same great maritime and commercial league.
Only the center of influence passes.
There are certain necessary requisites for the new center of
influence. The new center must be rich in the resources neces-
sary for the industrial revolution, and production must be or-
ganized on a mass basis. The new center must be in a position
to tie to herself by the threads of finance those portions of the
world in which the industrial revolution has just commenced. The
new center must be a commercial power with an important carry-
ing trade. Above all, the new center must have air and naval
supremacy—but that power must not be so great that the new
center could face a coalition of all the maritime states of the world.
The new center is destined to be North America, facing the new
channels of commerce, the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.
The transition has been many long years in the making, but
has become obvious only now. Canada has led all the Dominions
in the path of autonomy, and could never have done so but for her
close association with the United States. Each Canadian move to-
ward greater freedom has been underscored with the possibility
of union with the United States. Economically the two coun-
tries have long been close-knit. The unfortified boundary is the
evidence of political association, however unannounced. Coordina-
tion of defense and the President's promise to Canada join the two
countries in foreign and domestic policy. Australia and New Zea-
land are keenly aware that their political independence must de-
pend upon assistance from the United States. Today the British
Isles themselves must rely upon America for aid. The countries
associated with the Empire are equally aware of America's im-
portance. Finally by the transfer of the naval bases to American
control the issue is settled. When added to the other elements of
America's position the control of these bases is tantamount to the
control of the whole of the British Empire in the western hemi-
sphere. A similar coordination of defense at Singapore will ac-
complish the transfer of the Antipodes and the Far Eastern por-
tions of the Empire.
India and the Middle East have so far gone unmentioned, for
their relations with trie American center of Empire may be less
close. Yet the political aspirations of Islam, India, and China
lie far closer to the Anglo-Saxon pattern than to the ideas of
central Europe, and, even in the face of a battle for independence,
those areas will probably continue at least a cultural association
with the English-speaking world.
America's new responsibilities demand of her new policies.
Today we are acting in the name of defense. But defense alone
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can win only a truce, not a war. A positive program is needed.
Indeed, we can no longer talk the language of ten, twenty, and
fifty years ago. The continent of Europe today is dominated by
revolution. If America is to have the leadership of the world she
must have a positive and revolutionary program as full of real
promise as any alternative. If America's role is to win sacrifice
from her men and women, all must share equally in the benefits
as well as the burden.
To millions throughout the world, as well as to millions in
America, our policies of the past eight years offer the outstand-
ing hope of a free world which we may all share. At this time
the young men and women of Europe, of Africa, and Asia, and
of America, look upon our domestic policies as a gleaming ray of
hope. These policies represent the effort of a nation to build a
richer cultural and physical world not only for some men but for
all men. Similarly in the field of foreign affairs, the Good Neighbor
policy has demonstrated that we seek a better world not to exploit
it but to share it with all. That policy is capable of infinite ex-
tension.
And so, it is America's destiny during the coming century to
lead the fourth British Empire and the associated maritime and
commercial nations in the organization of a Pax Americana to the
end that we may have a more abundant world with liberty and
justice for all.
Warner Moss.
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